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CITATION TO THE RECORD 
All citations to the record on appeal, shall be as fol-
lows: "R." followed by the page number where the referenced 
portion of the record can be located. Citations to the tran-
script portion of the record shall be as follows: "Tr." fol-
lowed by the page number where the referenced portion of the 
transcript can be located. 
JURISDICTION 
For the reasons set forth herein and in appellee's memo-
randum in opposition to appellant's motion to amend docketing 
statement, appellee contests the court's jurisdiction. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The original docketing statement, which appellant has 
admitted contains an improper basis for appeal (see appellant's 
brief at pp. 6 and 11), states that the issue to be appealed is 
whether, in a contempt proceeding, a court can award attorney's 
fees against the party found in contempt. 
After the original due date for the filing of his brief, 
appellant attempted to amend his docketing statement to include 
new and different bases for appeal. Appellee has objected to 
appellant's efforts to amend his docketing statement to assert 
new bases for appeal. 
In the event this court determines it can properly consid-
er appellant's new bases for appeal, appellant's issues on 
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er appellant's new bases for appeal, appellant's issues on 
appeal appear to be as follows: 
1. Whether the trial court committed reversible error by 
refusing to consider evidence of provocation relating to 
appellant's violation of the trial court's order which enjoined 
him from contacting appellees business premises and appellee's 
employees; 
2. Whether appellant's counsel was ineffective by 
failing to rebut appellee's affidavit of attorney's fees and by 
failing to challenge an amended return of service which showed 
that appellant had duly received a supporting affidavit when 
served with the order to show cause. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The court, under Rule 10(e) of the Utah R. Civ. P. . can 
dismiss this appeal due to appellant's own representations that 
there is no merit to the original basis for appeal. Appel-
lant's original docketing statement filed herein provided that 
the issue on appeal was whether the trial court could award to 
appellee its attorney's fees incurred in prosecuting the order 
to show cause. Appellant has admitted in its filings that 
there is no merit to an appeal on that basis. See appellant's 
brief at pp. 6 and 11. However, appellant has subsequently 
amended his docketing statement to discard his previous basis 
for appeal and add new bases for appeal. Appellant's new 
theories include the trial court's refusal to consider mitigat-
2 
the alleged ineffectiveness of appellants counsel. 
In the event the court allows appellant to continue his 
appeal on the bases set forth in his amended docketing state-
ment , appellee submits that the appropriate standard of review 
is as follows: With respect to the trial court's alleged 
refusal to consider mitigating factors, the appropriate stan-
dard for review is the "clearly erroneous" standard of review. 
See Von Hake v. Thomas. 759 P.2d 1162, 1172 (Utah 1988) (an 
appellate court should apply the "clearly erroneous" standard 
of review when reviewing contempt proceedings). Findings are 
clearly erroneous only if they are without adequate evidentiary 
support. See State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). 
With respect to the issue of ineffectiveness of counsel, 
appellee submits that because this issue was never determined 
by the trial court, this issue is not properly before this 
court for review. This issue cannot be raised for the first 
time on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
a. Nature of the case. 
Appellant appeals from contempt proceedings held 
against him. Appellant he was sentenced to three days in jail, 
ordered to pay appellee's attorney's fees and fined for at 
least ten violations of a previous court order which enjoined 
appellant from telephoning appellee's business premises and 
from telephoning or contacting certain of appellee's employees 
3 
at their residences or any other location, 
b. Course of proceedings. 
Appellee filed a verified complaint in district court 
against appellant on February 6, 1992 seeking a preliminary and 
permanent injunction enjoining appellant from telephoning 
appellee and appellee's employees at appellee's place of 
business and from telephoning appellee's employees (with the 
exception of defendant's then estranged wife, Susan Bullock) at 
their residences or at any other location. R. at pp. 2-6. 
A temporary restraining order was issued on February 
6, 1992 temporarily restraining appellant from engaging in the 
harassment described above and setting a date for hearing on 
the motion for preliminary injunction. R. at pp. 25-26. A 
hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction was held on 
February 13, 1992. On February 25, 1992, the court entered an 
order enjoining appellant from telephoning appellee or any of 
its employees at appellee's place of business and enjoining 
appellant from telephoning appellee's employees (with the 
exception of Susan Bullock) at their personal residences or at 
any other location. R. at pp. 31-32. 
On June 26, 1992, appellee filed a motion for order 
to show cause on the basis that appellant had violated the 
court's order by making a number of harassing telephone calls 
to appellee's employees. R. at pp. 33-38. In the meantime, a 
supplemental affidavit of Tony V. Divino was filed setting 
forth ten additional threatening and harassing telephone calls 
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left on Mr. Divino's answering machine on June 27, 1992. R. at 
pp. 49-52. The hearing on the order to show cause was origi-
nally scheduled for July 6, 1992, but was continued to the 
following day. R. at pp. 48; Tr. at pp. 100-109. 
c. Disposition. 
The trial court found appellant in contempt of a 
court order on the basis that appellant had telephoned Tony V. 
Divino, the chief executive officer of appellee, and left at 
least ten violent, highly threatening, abusive and intimidating 
messages on Mr. Divino's answering machine. R. at pp. 86; Tr. 
at p. 156. The court found ten violations and fined appellant 
$50.00 per violation. R. at pp. 86 - 87; Tr. at p. 156. 
Appellant was also ordered to spend three days in jail. R. at 
pp. 87; Tr. at p. 157. The court subsequently ordered appel-
lant to pay plaintiff's reasonable attorney's fees in the 
amount of $2,445.50 for pursuing the order to show cause. R. 
at pp. 79-82 and 88-89. 
Appellant's original docketing statement provided 
that the issue on appeal would be whether the court could award 
appellee its attorney's fees in connection with the contempt. 
Appellant has subsequently represented and admitted to the 
court that his original basis for appeal had no merit. See 
appellant's brief at pp. 6 and 11. Appellant is now relying 
completely on new bases for appeal. 
5 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The trial court entered an order on February 25, 1992 
preliminarily enjoining appellant from telephoning or contact-
ing appellee or any of appellee's employees, at the business 
premises of appellee. R. at pp. 31-32. 
2. On March 20, 1992, despite the foregoing preliminary 
injunction, appellant left a message on the answering machine 
of Tony V. Divino, chief executive officer of appellee. R. at 
p. 42. 
3. On June 24, 1992, appellant left two additional 
messages on Mr. Divino's answering machine. R. at pp. 42-43. 
4. On June 26, 1992, appellee filed a motion for order 
to show cause as a result of the foregoing telephone calls. R. 
at pp. 33-43. The court issued an order to show cause on June 
26, 1992 ordering appellant to appear on July 6, 1992 to show 
cause why the court should not find him in contempt, impose a 
fine, sentence him to jail and award appellee its reasonable 
attorney's fees. R. at pp. 44-45. 
5. On June 27, 1992, subsequent to the issuance of the 
order to show cause, appellant left at least ten additional 
threatening and harassing messages on Mr. Divino's answering 
machine. R. at pp. 49-52 and 85. These messages were tran-
scribed as follows: 
Saturday, June 27, 1992, 5:10 p.m.: 
"Tony, John Bullock. I understand you're 
gonna (unintelligible) with summons. Good. 
It takes a long time to get it on." 
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Saturday, June 27, 1992, 7:47 p.m.: 
"You're on the phone, asshole. You act 
like you're busy. You're out playing with 
your kids and taking care of shit, you 
know. But it's short hair, short balls, 
short self. You read me boy? This is war 
and your fucking little balls are gonna 
pay." 
Saturday, June 27, 1992, 8:30 p.m.: 
"Tony, I doubt you've got the hair on your 
balls or that your balls are big enough or 
that you're tall enough, you know (laugh-
ter) . Here's how it goes boy. I go to 
prison on the violation of this order. I 
got Tony Volpi. I got him recorded. He's 
guilty as hell. You protect him. You 
fucking run your own business. That's it." 
Saturday, June 27, 1992, 8:32 p.m.: 
"Here's the way we can resolve this, Tony. 
I can go to the F.B.I, and (unintelligible) 
you're dealin' dope." (laughter). 
Saturday, June 27, 1992, 8:33 p.m.: 
"Or, you short haired, short balled, short 
little asshole, you can go to court and you 
could admit that you're allowing it to be 
dealt. I've got it all recorded. I've got 
Tony Volpi up here basically admitting it. 
Hey, you fucking asshole, I tried to 
straighten you out. I tried to straighten 
you out." 
Saturday, June 27, 1992, 8:52 p.m.: 
"Tony, I talked to your parents. I told 
them that you allow, I couldn't really tell 
them that you encourage (unintelligible) 
Tony Volpi up there that got my wife. Fuck 
you boy." 
Saturday, June 27, 1992, 8:54 p.m.: 
"John Bullock, 966-3252. Your kid is in-
volved with screwing with my wife cause he 
allowed Tony Volpi to deal dope at his 
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dealership. That's it." 
Saturday, June 27, 1992, 9:27 p.m.: 
"Been talking with the Toyota of Ogden 
office, Tony. And, uh, behind Volpi is 
some guy who calls himself the third. And 
he's been telling me that I'm gonna suck 
his dick, and then he tells me he's got Sue 
in the bathroom sucking his dick. And he's 
really crazy because all of this shit plays 
on talk radio. I recorded it. That's the 
way it goes, boy." 
Saturday, June 27, 1992, 10:35 p.m.: 
"Yeah, Tony, John Bullock again. I was 
just on talk radio and I was talking about 
dealers of Japanese cars in Ogden. Okay, 
you're not quite identified yet but I was 
talking about how they took my wife and 
they, uh, like through, I didn't say Tony 
Volpi's name, but, uh, through Tony Volpi, 
he introduced her to cocaine and heroine 
and through this the third guy, I was told 
tonight as I called they got her in the 
back room sucking cock so she can't talk. 
I don't know what the fuck you're running 
up there, boy, but I'm telling you that 
when some fucking guy like that talks to me 
like that I make you responsible!" 
Saturday, June 27, 1992, 10:37 p.m.: 
"Tony (unintelligible) when I go to prison, 
they'll talk to me. Guess what else? When 
I talk to those boys down there that know 
my gym, and how well I treated people like 
them, you're gonna get 50 or 40 more phone 
calls—or something." 
6. Appellant was served with the order to show cause, 
the motion in support thereof and an affidavit of Tony Divino 
on June 29, 1992. See copy of amended constable's return in 
the appendix hereto (a copy of the amended constable's return 
is also contained in the appendix to appellant's brief). 
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7. At the hearing scheduled for July 6, 1992, appellant 
was represented by counsel Ray S. Stoddard who requested that 
the matter be continued. The court continued the matter to the 
following day. Tr. at pp. 107-109. 
8. On both July 6 and 7, appellant7s counsel argued 
extensively that the court had no jurisdiction on the basis 
that appellant was not served with an affidavit when served 
with the order to show cause. Tr. at pp. 100-107, 113 and 116. 
At the beginning of the proceedings on July 7, appellant's 
counsel renewed its motion that the court lacked jurisdiction. 
Tr. at p. 113. After the amended constable's return was 
submitted to the court, appellant's counsel again renewed his 
motion. Tr. at p. 116. However, the court was satisfied that 
it had jurisdiction. Tr. at p. 177. 
9. At the July 7, 1992 hearing, the court heard evidence 
from Mr. Divino regarding the aforementioned messages he 
received from appellant. Tr. at pp. 120-129. 
10. The court heard testimony from appellant of his 
admission that he made the telephone calls outlined in Mr. 
Divino's affidavit including testimony that he remembered 
calling Divino twice on the 27th and vaguely recalled the tenth 
message he left on Mr. Divino's answering machine. Tr. at pp. 
143-145 and 150 ("And we are not contesting the actual con-
tempt. We feel he did violate the court order. He is admit-
ting that.") 
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11. The trial court heard testimony that appellant could 
not remember other telephone calls made on June 27, 1992 
because he was intoxicated. Tr. at p. 142. 
12. The trial court heard testimony that appellant 
believed he was provoked into making the telephone calls by 
appellee's employees and that he was intoxicated at the time he 
made the telephone calls to Mr, Divino. Tr. at pp. 135, 13 6-
144. 
13. After hearing testimony, the trial court noted that 
the alleged "goading" or provocation would not have occurred if 
appellant had not violated the order by making the initial 
telephone call to appellee's place of business. R. at pp. 86; 
Tr. at p. 155. 
14. Based upon the evidence presented at the hearing, the 
court found that at the time of the violation of the order, 
appellant was aware of the order, had the ability to comply 
with the order and willfully and knowingly failed and refused 
to comply with the order. R. at pp. 85-86 and Tr. at p. 155. 
15. The court also noted that appellant's conduct consti-
tuted a "flagrant violation" of the court's order and that the 
court had never had a contempt case where there had been such a 
clear violation. Tr. at p. 156. Further, the court noted that 
the messages left on Mr. Divino's machine were violent and 
highly threatening, abusive and intimidating. Tr. at p. 156. 
16. The court ordered appellant to spend three days in 
jail and pay a fine of $500.00 ($50.00 for ten violations of 
10 
the order) R. .r. up B ^ - H and *> .it f . I so 157. 
1 7 . Tl HE i f. i *.i -.: • * > ; I aw support-
ing the court's ruling were entered * -4.
 h >9 2„ R. at 
pp. 84-87. 
18. i \ subssqi u *i it 01 < i* =!Mi 11 e g a i < :1 :i 1 < 3 < i t 1; : 1: 1 ic ay's fees was 
entered 01 1 August :i 0, 1992. This order awarded appellee its 
attorney's fees i n the amount of $2,445.50 incurred in prose-
c u t i r u j I In I:; c)] : der I: : si: u ::::« cai l se R a t pp 8 8 -8 9 . • • 
1 9 Tl: le n o t i c e of appeal was f i l e d < :>i 1 August 24 1992 . 
R . « c |JI 9 0 . • • 
' 111 
days) on September 29, 1992. ThiL docketing statement stated 
that the basis ' appeal was • • * o . t -i. - no authority • 
order defend 
tion with the contempt. 
2:.:i Appe] ] ee filed a motior *• dismiss due to the lat<* 
fi 1 i ng of the docketinq statem* . - • l / , 19"').". Tint 
motion was subsequently denied. 
22. On Octobei the day before appellant's brief 
was due, appelj . - - » It 1 I In 1 I y <J.iy *?xt e n s i nii l u 
file his brief. 
2 3 Appellee opposed appellant's motion 01 1 October z), 
199 3 • 
24, On November 15, 1993, appellant filed a motion to 
amend his docketing statement. In tlle memorandum in support ; 
that motion, appellant represented t : • 1:1 ic :::c H I I : t tl: lat tl n . ^ ^ : 
1± 
"appears to have been without merit" and that he "perceived no 
meritorious argument for appeal as originally filed," 
25. Appellee objected to appellant's attempt to amend his 
docketing statement at this late stage of the proceedings. 
26. Appellant filed his brief on November 22, 1993 under 
the apparent assumption that the court would allow him to 
continue his appeal under the bases set forth in his amended 
docketing statement. 
27. This court subsequently ruled that appellant's motion 
for extension of time to file brief and motion to amend docket-
ing statement were granted. Appellee's motion to dismiss was 
reserved pending plenary presentation and consideration of the 
case. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED. 
The present appeal should be dismissed on the basis that 
appellant has admitted his appeal as originally filed lacks 
merit and because his appellate brief is based upon issues not 
asserted in the original docketing statement. The amended 
docketing statement was filed well beyond 21 days after the 
notice of appeal was filed and can therefore be dismissed under 
Rule 9(e) of the Utah R. App. P. 
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POINT 
APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO REVERSAL OR 
ON BASIS OF INEFFECTIVE COUNSEL. 
Th^ claim oi J nettect.i vencss <'»! ."nniv.fl : :> h * »i1 11 f be denial 
because ' cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. 
Ku'tthe: L-iiis was . contempt hearing in a civil ivise and a 
constitutional clai m o4 .:=. rfecti ve assist ance nf cviiim, ,<> 1 does 
not apply. 
Even if appe i KIIII. Ii.ifi «i claim. oj; ,;• a loi ineffective-
ness of trial counsel, appellant has ta.:* •-<-> ^ eet its burden 
i)f showing that his counsel was ineffective and that lie 
a2 leged i i icffectivej less WGI aid 1 ;ai *c cat ised a different result in 
the tria1 court• 
P0I1 IT III 
ALLEGED FAILURE OF COURT TO CONSIDER MITIGATING 
FACTORS DOES NOT CONSTITUTE REVERSIBLE ERROR, 
Appellee submits that the trial court heard and considered 
ample testimony ot alleged provocation as potential mitigating 
I a e t OJ s • i I I in mi in in I 1 1 1 1 1 in I , i > , i s o v r > 1 1 1 1 e i • i mi I i  ii 1 1 ; 
without merit. Additional1y, the alleged provocation arose out 
•*• appellant's voluntary conduct ••• violating the court's order 
I H 11' pIJ > * M e t i1 I l| L l l " t «, 1»ij !.i ' l i e s i : i»r em.i ses. 
Therefore, the trial court was justified if It rejected appell-
ant 's claim of provocation , 
Pi iia] ] y, I IK1 I ai I I licit appel I,ml «a« mil pui isheil or 
sanctioned under Utah Code Ann. §78-32-10J as severely as he 
I 
could have been sanctioned, militates against appellant's claim 
that the court's alleged failure to consider mitigating circum-
stances constitutes reversible error. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED. 
On November 15, 1993, one month after his appellate brief 
was originally due and over thirty days after appellant re-
quested a thirty-day extension to file his brief, appellant 
filed a motion to amend his docketing statement. The original 
docketing statement set forth as the issue on appeal that the 
court lacked authority to award appellee its attorney's fees in 
connection with the order to show cause regarding contempt. No> 
other issues were stated. In his memorandum in support of 
motion to amend docketing statement, appellant admits that such 
a basis for appeal is without merit: 
Defendant's review of the trial court tran-
script in case file as provided indicate 
that the appeal as filed appears to have 
been without merit....Appellant perceives 
no meritorious argument for appeal as orig-
inally filed... 
Additionally, appellant's brief acknowledges that the 
original basis for appeal is without merit. See appellant's 
brief at pp. 6 and 11. Consistent with appellant's acknowledg-
ment, the case law in Utah is clear that under the "costs and 
expenses" provision of Utah Code Ann. §78-32-11, attorney's 
14 
fees can be proper] y awarded in a contempt proceeding. See, 
e.g. . Bradshaw v. Kershaw, < .».2<1 IJ.'M, M I MI+ ,I, vmt) 
The amended docketing statement attempts replace the 
ci njirwl Ki.siii for appeal with i lew bases focusinr on the 
alleged ineffectiveness of appellant's counsel Uiw I 
court level and the court's failure to consider alleged provo-
r.rit i.on a?1"1:: i inn i. t icjaii iinq f a c t o r . T h e b r i e f f i l e d b y a p p e l l a n t s 
based upon the amended docketing statement. Apr .i 
not be allowed to w.iir th • i 4 ^ »v: after s <> original date rcr 
fi ] iii rig 1 1  :ii • 1 )i I ef I: : • - * statemen : eplace 
1Ile original basis for appea . ., : £fecti\e . i low 
appellar* *r h»- appeal uu • .it > completely new appeal 
appeal 
and docketing statement ractice flies < rcice .-z 
the rules of appe] ] ate procedure. In short, because appellant 
in*J i* in I mi I I teciiiiiir-.'i1" I hi.1 
amended docketing statement was filed well beyond the time 
prescribed under Rule 9(e) of the Utah R. A P P . P., the appeal 
ilii >u .hi I .it • 11 i ,sm I s st Mil. 
POINT II 
APPELI J \ NT IS NOT ENTITLED TO REVERSAL OR NKW TR I M, 
ON BASIS OF INEFFECTIVE COUNSEL. 
A p p e J l a m l in "I . . i n i l l i iiiiiH f oc«1 i y«» i i I I I I I P . P I  i l 
the trial court leve ^ --.-»pt-r method for addressing 
alleged attorney misconduct ui ineffectiveness is to move the 
trial court for a new trial. See, e.cr. , Nelson v. Truiillo, 657 
P.2d 730, 734 (Utah 1982). In civil cases, even if a party 
requests a new trial, new trials are generally not granted 
based upon the incompetence or negligence of the party's trial 
counsel. Jennings v. Stoker. 652 P.2d 912, 913 (Utah 1982). 
At any rate, an appellate court cannot consider a motion for a 
new trial because such a motion should be made in the trial 
court (see id. at 913) under Rule 60(b) of the Utah R. Civ. P. 
See Stewart v. Sullivan, 506 P.2d 74 (Utah 1973) (Rule 60(b)(7) 
is broad enough to allow a court to set aside an order on the 
basis of incompetent counsel). 
In the present matter, appellant is effectively asking 
this appellate court to grant a new trial on the basis of 
ineffective counsel. This procedure is inappropriate under the 
authorities cited above.1 However, if this court determines it 
can properly review the issue of ineffectiveness of counsel in 
this case, appellee submits appellant has failed to meet his 
burden of showing that his counsel was ineffective and that had 
his counsel done the things appellant claims should have been 
done, the result would have been different. See Jennings, 652 
P.2d 914. 
Criminal cases in Utah establish that in order to prevail 
*It should also be noted that because the trial court 
record is generally insufficient, even in criminal cases, the 
appellate court is generally not competent to review claims of 
ineffective counsel. See State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027, 
1029 (Utah 1991). 
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laim of ineffectiveness of counsel, i party has the • 
burden of showing counsel :. performance irl 1 be3 ow Llit" objec-
tive standard of reasonableness and that 11le alleged deficiency 
w as preji idi cial to the party li: I order to show prejudicial 
effect, there must be a reasonable probability that. I he umfiumiie 
would have favored the party had alleged deficiency not 
ntirurrpil V P I | State Vj, - , •' ^  1 :]l" °d 204, 212 (Utah 
App. 1991 ) "Reasonable probabil lefined as probabi .' v 
undermine confidence in outcome. State v. Templen. 805 P. d 
3 ; (I Jt .ah 2 99 0) Tl: le mer < ; fact tl: lat a defendant receives 
an unfavorable result does not gi v e i i se to the conclusion that 
counsel's performance was defective. State v. Montes, 804 P 2d 
5 4 3 (Ut: .; nl: :i I \ ]:: »j: 1 9S I ) -
Additionally, a court, reviewing a cl aim. of ineffective-
ness, will not second-guess an attorney's legitimate exercise 
*,s id 1 i i il »<K i jc ,. mil - 1 i i t'cc|ies , Codianna v_. Morris, M n 
P.2d 1101, 1109 (Utah 1983). Effective representation does not 
require counsel to object when doing so would be futile. State 
v. Malmrose, <»4 ^  I" »" < I h < >
 ( ' >«i (111 , j I m 1 " » H J ) , 
Is Attorney's Fees. 
nn the basis M! appellee's attorney's •^ - affidavit, 
I lie: coin I awardi cl app« " ; 
and expenses" provision t Utah Code Ann, «j 78--, - u Appel-
lant claims that his counsel s failure * rebut L U C attorney's 
fees affidavit constitutes ineffectiveness. 
With respect, to the issue of award of attorney ' s 
il  ) 
fees, appellant has no constitutional right to effective 
counsel. In Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1988), the 
Utah Supreme Court held that the distinction between civil 
contempt and criminal contempt is that a contempt order is 
criminal if its purpose is to vindicate a court's authority, 
even though the order arises from civil proceedings. A con-
tempt order is civil if it has a remedial purpose, either to 
coerce the individual into complying with the order given for 
the benefit of the other party, or to compensate the aggrieved 
party for injuries resulting from the individual's failure to 
comply with the order. Id. at 1168. Under this case, the 
award of attorney's fees, which was clearly intended to compen-
sate appellee, is in the nature of a civil contempt order and 
the constitutional guarantees asserted by appellant do not 
apply. See Davidson v. Munsey, 80 P. 743, 745 (Utah 1905) 
(proceedings under Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-11 are civil and not 
criminal in nature) (decided under prior law). Appellant has 
no claim of ineffectiveness with respect to the attorney's fees 
issue. 
Even if this court determines that appellant can 
assert his claim of ineffectiveness in relation to the 
attorney's fees issue, appellant was not prejudiced by its 
counsel's alleged ineffectiveness. Although the reasonableness 
of the fees was never rebutted, the court, in all of its 
experience and knowledge concerning reasonableness of fees, 
found that the fees were reasonable. R. at pp. 81-82 and 88-
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fa^ x L j_s dOUbtful that appellant could have rebutted the 
reasonableness of :• \*. • .*- . The fees were i easonab] e h \ liabt 
of the legal work necessitated by appellant's violation ui the 
order. This work included drafting of order to show « ::ause 
documents, conferences wi th wi I: .nesses, i ev lew a:i i< i 1: .1 ai iscr i j »t:i on 
of appellant's telephone messages, preparati on of affidavits, 
researching issues relevant to the contempt hearing and prepar-
ing for ai id attending the contempt heari ng Appel ] ee sail 
that «M. attempt V. rebut • object to appellee's affidavit :-\ 
. • • . ••* • - .dve jjeen futile. A fai ] lire to object 
when - . wl i ut.- .,L..I- to AQ so does not constitute ineffec-
tiveness of counsel. State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d at 
B. J urisdiction. 
Appellant also argues that hi? counsel was ineffec-
tive tf* failing .ursue ^ claim that * * ti 1\ < c
 (
 ?
 lacked 
J 
appellant claims Ile was served only W J I , . ; order t^ now , duse 
and not a supporting affidavit a; required under Rule - the 
Utah R. Civ I I I 11 t 1 "i 1 1 \ 111 f' n< I<' 11 
service i n this case, appellaM .v -s served with the : i<-• 
show cause and supporting affidavit A copy of the amended 
v ' 1. 
Despite the amended constable's return, appellent/s 
counsel argues extensively at the hearing that the court 1 acked 
i in j i s d 11 • 1 L < > 1 "' mi • mi a t 1111 11 ci 0 11 0 2 , :i 0< I :i 0 ; , n i d :i 1 2 • :i 1 ; M 1 .1 i< * 
beginning of the proceedings on J 11 ] } 7, 1 993, appellant's 
counsel renewed the objections made the day before regarding 
jurisdiction. Tr. at p. 113. After the amended constable's 
return was submitted to the court, counsel again renewed its 
objection. Tr. at p. 4. Despite counsel's efforts to chal-
lenge jurisdiction, the court expressed its satisfaction that 
it had jurisdiction in this case. Tr. at p. 117. 
It is clear from the record that appellant's counsel 
made extensive challenges to the jurisdiction of the trial 
court. The fact that he failed to make a direct objection to 
the amended constable's return does not, on the authorities 
cited previously, constitute performance falling below the 
objective standard of reasonableness. No evidence has been 
submitted by appellant supporting his contention that the 
failure to object to the amended constable's return constituted 
conduct below the objective standard of conduct or that he was 
denied a fair hearing as a result of his counsel's failure to 
object. It is clear from the transcript of the hearing that 
the court had determined it had jurisdiction despite the 
arguments made by appellant's counsel. Tr. at p. 117. Even if 
counsel had objected, it is apparent the result would have been 
the same. 
A review of the transcript of the contempt hearing 
reveals that appellant's counsel was active at the hearing, 
made objections to assert his client's position and otherwise 
zealously represented his client. In his brief, appellant 
admits his counsel was "persistent". Appellant's brief at p. 
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15. Appellant has failed *• present any persuasive arguments 
or evidence that 1 i,i s coi. •• - •.:- i no M e e t MM* UI t II,I1 I ho 
alleged ineffectiveness would have changed the ultimate result 
in this case. 
• , "ihis cdM( 11. \ l in 111 c * Thon nm in unlet en |M ) i n i in) 
defendant from making certain telephone cal Is and, contacts. He 
admittedly viol ated the court's order and the court found him 
i n contempt. As a resu.1 t of 111: i <> w 11 ' ui id" ict,- def endai it was 
fined, jai led for three days and,, ordered to pay plaint! ff ,:i ts 
attorney J"s fees. It i s difficult to i magine that the result 
would have been any d :i fferent i f appc il ] ai i, t::,|rs counsel 1: lad 
performed as appellant believes he should have performed. 
POINT III . ,,.:. 
ALLEGED FAILURE OF COURT TO CONSIDER MITIGATING 
FACTORS NOT REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
Appellant claims that * -• :.*: .i ' eomiaitted reversible 
« •• ! ! ; • • Liiii ti gati ng 
factors surrounding appellant's contempt of the court1" s order. 
The alleged mitigating factor asserted by appellant is that 
a p p e 1 1 anil WHS | HI O"« mkoi I  I i " i'i| ipo I l o o * MI ompl ciyeesi,, in 1 I in I ninn, 
appellant made telephone calls to Mi Di vi no's residence and 
his answering machine which resulted In appellant being found 
i in con 
quired t ti.-su :ontempt .» showing (1) that defendant 
knew what was required by previous court order, (2) that he had 
the ability to comply with such order and (3) that he willfully 
and knowingly failed and refused to do so. See Coleman v. 
Colemanf 664 P.2d 1155 (Utah 1983). After hearing the evi-
dence, the trial court made these findings. 
At any rate, even if alleged provocation is relevant in a 
contempt proceeding, a review of the transcript of the order to 
show cause hearing reveals that the court heard ample testimony 
about and was aware of alleged mitigating circumstances. 
Appellant admitted that he attempted to call his estranged wife 
at appellee's business premises which was in violation of the 
court order. Tr. at pp. 134-136. Appellant claims that the 
person who was on the other end of the telephone made an 
insulting remark to him and that because he had been drinking 
substantially, he responded "in kind" which was reflected in 
the messages he left for Mr. Divino. Tr. at pp. 137 and 138-
139. Appellant was also allowed to testify that when he drinks 
substantially he cannot control himself and is not aware of 
things he does. Tr. at pp. 140-141. 
In short, the court heard the alleged provocative state-
ments and also heard that appellant had been drinking, infer-
ring that appellant's conduct was somehow excused or that any 
penalties imposed by the court should take the mitigating 
factors into account. 
In response to appellant's assertions, the trial court 
noted that if appellant had not violated the order in the first 
place by initiating telephone calls, he would not have been 
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provoked. Tr. at p. 155. The alleged provocation arose from 
appellant's own misconduct in failing to comply with the court 
order. Appellee submits that appellant's argument that the 
court's failure to admit evidence of the alleged mitigating 
factor constitutes reversible error is without merit. 
In further response to appellant's claim, it should be 
noted that he was not punished as severely as he could have 
been punished under Utah Code Ann. §78-32-10. Appellant was 
fined $50.00 a piece for ten violations of the court order. 
The maximum amount he could have been fined for each violation 
was $200.00. Additionally, appellant was sentenced to merely 
three days in jail. However, the statute gave the court 
authority to sentence him for thirty days for each violation. 
In short, despite the "flagrant violation" of the court order 
and the violent, threatening and abusive nature of the tele-
phone messages left on Mr. Divino's answering machine, the 
penalty imposed was minimal in comparison to what the court 
could have imposed. It is difficult to imagine that appellant 
could have been treated less severely than he was. In light of 
the evidence presented at the hearing, even if the alleged 
mitigating factor of provocation should have been considered, 
appellant has failed to establish that the "clearly erroneous" 
standard has been met in this case. The penalties imposed in 
this case for contempt were reasonable and supported by the 
evidence. Appellant was not prejudiced by the trial court's 
alleged failure to consider mitigating factors. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, appellee respectfully requests 
the court to dismiss the appeal or, in the alternative, deny 
the relief requested by appellant and to award appellee its 
costs and attorney's fees incurred in defending this appeal. 
DATED this [0 day of January, 1994. 
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee 
lis V. Haslam, (#1408) 
.liam W. Downes, Jr., (#0907) 
in W. Holt, (#5720) 
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APPENDIX TO APPELLEE'S BRIEF 
Amended Constable's Return (attached) 
CONSTABLE'S RETURN 
I, JAN PHELPS , being first duly sworn on oath and say: 
I am a duly appointed Deputy Constable, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
citizen of the United States over the age of 21 years at the time of service 
srein, and not a part of or interested in the within action. 
I received the within and hereto annexed, 
IDER TO SHOW CAUSE & MOTION & AFFIDAVIT 
MEMORANDUM 
I the 26 of JUN , 1992 , and served the same upon BULLOCK, JOHN R. 
( 
within named defendant in said, ( 
( 
IDER TO SHOW CAUSE & MOTION & AFFIDAVIT 
MEMORANDUM 
\ serving a true copy of said, 
IDER TO SHOW CAUSE & MOTION & AFFIDAVIT 
MEMORANDUM 
>r the defendant with JOHN R. BULLOCK (PERSONALLY) 
person of suitable age and discretion there residing at, 
175 WEST 4700 SOUTH #59 ,SALT LAKE CITY 
.3/her usual place of ABODE , on this 29 day of JUN ,1992 
I further ceritfy that at the time of service of the said, 
tOER TO SHOW CAUSE & MOTION & AFFIDAVIT 
MEMORANDUM 
endorsed the date and place of service and added my name and official 
Itle thereto. 
On the 29. day of JUN , 1992 
Deputy /f~ Auf&-
 S L SQ2 
Robert Reitz Constable, Salt Lake County 
396 Cypress St., Midvale Ut, 84047 580-1741 
s^ Service Fee 
Mileage 
2nd Address 
postage/Filing 
Copies 
Extra Cost 
$6.00 
$15,00 
Total $21.00 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused four copies of the forego- i 
ing APPELLEE'S BRIEF to be mailed, postage prepaid, on this l\J 
day of January, 1994, to: 
John R. Bullock, Pro Se 
Defendant-Appellant 
5075 West 4700 South, #59 
West Valley City, UT 84118 
1124\003\bnefapp 
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